Governing The Global
Environment
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Edited by Carlo Carraro, Professor of Econometrics and Environmental
Economics, University of Venice, Italy and Research Director, Fondazione
Eni Enrico Mattei, Italy
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Contents:
Acknowledgements
Introduction Global Governance for Sustainable Development Carlo Carraro
PART I GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS
1. Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg and Marc A. Stern (1999), ‘Defining Global
Public Goods’
2. Jean Hampton (1987), ‘Free-Rider Problems in the Production of
Collective Goods’
3. Duncan Snidal (1985), ‘Coordination versus Prisoners’ Dilemma:
Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes’
4. Robert D. Putnam (1988), ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of
Two-level Games’
5. Todd Sandler (1999), ‘Intergenerational Public Goods: Strategies,
Efficiency and Institutions’
6. Scott Barrett (2001), ‘International Cooperation for Sale’
PART II ENVIRONMENTAL GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
7. Jonathan Baert Wiener (1999), ‘On the Political Economy of Global
Environmental Regulation’
8. Scott Barrett (1994), ‘Self-enforcing International Environmental
Agreements’
9. Carlo Carraro and Domenico Siniscalco (1993), ‘Strategies for the
International Protection of the Environment’
10. Geoffrey Heal (1994), ‘Formation of International Environmental
Agreements’
11. Todd Sandler and Keith Sargent (1995), ‘Management of Transnational
Commons: Coordination, Publicness, and Treaty Formation’
12. Michael Hoel and Kerstin Schneider (1997), ‘Incentives to Participate
in an International Environmental Agreement’
13. Scott Barrett (1997), ‘Towards a Theory of International Environmental
Cooperation’
14. Henry Tulkens (1998), ‘Cooperation Versus Free-riding in International
Environmental Affairs: Two Approaches’
15. Carlo Carraro and Domenico Siniscalco (2001), ‘Transfers, Commitments,
and Issue Linkage in International Environmental Negotiations’
16. Eric Neumayer (2001), ‘How Regime Theory and the Economic Theory of
International Environmental Cooperation Can Learn from Each Other’
PART III APPLICATIONS TO GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
A Climate Change
17. Michael Hoel (1994), ‘Efficient Climate Policy in the Presence of Free
Riders’
18. Richard B. Stewart and Jonathan B. Wiener (2001), ‘Reconstructing
Climate Policy: The Paths Ahead’
19. Carlo Carraro (2002), ‘Climate Change Policy: Models, Controversies
and Strategies’
B Ozone Layer
20. Winfried Lang (1991), ‘Is the Ozone Depletion Regime a Model for an
Emerging Regime on Global Warming?’
21. Scott Barrett (1999), ‘Montreal versus Kyoto: International
Cooperation and the Global Environment’
C Biodiversity
22. Scott Barrett (1994), ‘The Biodiversity Supergame’
23. Edward B. Barbier (2000), ‘Biodiversity, Trade and International
Agreements’
D Acid Rain
24. Karl-Göran Mäler (1989), ‘The Acid Rain Game’
25. Veijo Kaitala, Karl-Göran Mäler and Henry Tulkens (1995), ‘The Acid
Rain Game as a Resource Allocation Process with an Application to the
International Cooperation among Finland, Russia and Estonia’
PART IV TOOLS
26. Sang-Seung Yi (1997), ‘Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities’
27. Francis Bloch (1997), ‘Non-cooperative Models of Coalition Formation
in Games with Spillovers’
28. Carlo Carraro (1997), ‘Modelling International Policy Games: Lessons
from European Monetary Coordination’
Name Index
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