Governing The Global Environment


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Edited by Carlo Carraro, Professor of Econometrics and Environmental Economics, University of Venice, Italy and Research Director, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Italy

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Contents:


Acknowledgements


Introduction Global Governance for Sustainable Development Carlo Carraro


PART I GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS


1. Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg and Marc A. Stern (1999), ‘Defining Global Public Goods’
2. Jean Hampton (1987), ‘Free-Rider Problems in the Production of Collective Goods’
3. Duncan Snidal (1985), ‘Coordination versus Prisoners’ Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes’
4. Robert D. Putnam (1988), ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games’
5. Todd Sandler (1999), ‘Intergenerational Public Goods: Strategies, Efficiency and Institutions’
6. Scott Barrett (2001), ‘International Cooperation for Sale’


PART II ENVIRONMENTAL GLOBAL GOVERNANCE


7. Jonathan Baert Wiener (1999), ‘On the Political Economy of Global Environmental Regulation’
8. Scott Barrett (1994), ‘Self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements’
9. Carlo Carraro and Domenico Siniscalco (1993), ‘Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment’
10. Geoffrey Heal (1994), ‘Formation of International Environmental Agreements’
11. Todd Sandler and Keith Sargent (1995), ‘Management of Transnational Commons: Coordination, Publicness, and Treaty Formation’
12. Michael Hoel and Kerstin Schneider (1997), ‘Incentives to Participate in an International Environmental Agreement’
13. Scott Barrett (1997), ‘Towards a Theory of International Environmental Cooperation’
14. Henry Tulkens (1998), ‘Cooperation Versus Free-riding in International Environmental Affairs: Two Approaches’
15. Carlo Carraro and Domenico Siniscalco (2001), ‘Transfers, Commitments, and Issue Linkage in International Environmental Negotiations’
16. Eric Neumayer (2001), ‘How Regime Theory and the Economic Theory of International Environmental Cooperation Can Learn from Each Other’


PART III APPLICATIONS TO GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS


A Climate Change
17. Michael Hoel (1994), ‘Efficient Climate Policy in the Presence of Free Riders’
18. Richard B. Stewart and Jonathan B. Wiener (2001), ‘Reconstructing Climate Policy: The Paths Ahead’
19. Carlo Carraro (2002), ‘Climate Change Policy: Models, Controversies and Strategies’
B Ozone Layer
20. Winfried Lang (1991), ‘Is the Ozone Depletion Regime a Model for an Emerging Regime on Global Warming?’
21. Scott Barrett (1999), ‘Montreal versus Kyoto: International Cooperation and the Global Environment’
C Biodiversity
22. Scott Barrett (1994), ‘The Biodiversity Supergame’
23. Edward B. Barbier (2000), ‘Biodiversity, Trade and International Agreements’
D Acid Rain
24. Karl-Göran Mäler (1989), ‘The Acid Rain Game’
25. Veijo Kaitala, Karl-Göran Mäler and Henry Tulkens (1995), ‘The Acid Rain Game as a Resource Allocation Process with an Application to the International Cooperation among Finland, Russia and Estonia’


PART IV TOOLS


26. Sang-Seung Yi (1997), ‘Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities’
27. Francis Bloch (1997), ‘Non-cooperative Models of Coalition Formation in Games with Spillovers’
28. Carlo Carraro (1997), ‘Modelling International Policy Games: Lessons from European Monetary Coordination’


Name Index